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I Introduction
"...[I]n most of the economy IT will help to increase competition.
Broadly speaking, the Internet reduces barriers to entry, because it is cheaper to set
up a business online than to open a traditional shop or office. The Internet also makes it
easier for consumers to compare prices. Both these factors increase competition."
The Economist, September 21, 2000
The internet is a type of telecommunication technology. Conjectures like this in The
Economist indicate that there can be a positive relationship between the more intensive
use and the wider adoption (hereafter, diffusion) of telecommunication technologies and
competition in services and goods markets (for similar conjectures see Leff, 1984; Freund
and Weinhold, 2004; Czernich et al., 2011).
In this study, we empirically investigate the effect of the country-wide diffusion of
telecommunication technologies on the competition in services and goods markets. In
order to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use a difference-in-differences framework in
the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998). More specifically, we ask whether in countries
with higher diffusion of telecommunication technologies the intensity of product market
competition is different in the industries that depend more on these technologies com-
pared to the industries that depend less. We use input-output matrices to measure the
dependence on telecommunication technologies of industries. Our main measure of the
diffusion of telecommunication technologies is the number of fixed-lines and mobile tele-
phone subscribers per capita. It captures the adoption and use of telecommunications in
the economy (e.g., Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001). In turn, the main measure of product
market competition is the price-cost margin. We use evidence from 21 European countries
to establish our results.
Our results suggest that the diffusion of telecommunication technologies has a strong
positive effect on the intensity of competition in services and goods markets. This finding
is robust to various measures of competition, dependence, and diffusion. It is also robust
to a wide range of specification checks and alternative identification assumptions, where
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we tackle further the endogeneity concerns. It supports conjectures such as in the quote
above from The Economist.
To get a sense for the magnitude of the effect, consider the price-cost margin differ-
ential between industries at the 75th percentile (Real Estate Activities) and at the 25th
percentile (Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment) of the distribution of dependence
on telecommunication technologies. Our estimates imply that this differential is higher
by 0.02 in a country at the 25th percentile (as Estonia) of the distribution of telecom-
munication technologies diffusion than in a country at the 75th percentile (as France).
This differential is economically sizable. For instance, it constitutes the 11 percent of the
sample mean of the price-cost margin.
According to the standard theoretical inference, our results imply that the diffusion
of telecommunication technologies increases allocative efficiency in the economy since
it intensifies competition. Our results also imply that, through the same channel, the
diffusion of telecommunication technologies can lead to productivity gains (Nickell, 1996;
Syverson, 2004) and increase innovative activity (Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2005;
Griffith et al., 2010).1
This study contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of telecommunica-
tion technologies, as well as of information and communication technologies (ICT), on
economic performance. Macro-level empirical studies suggest that the diffusion of these
technologies has a positive impact on the development level and growth (e.g., Ro¨ller and
Waverman, 2001; Jorgenson and Vu, 2005). Micro-level empirical studies, in turn, find
that the use of telecommunication technologies and ICT can reduce price dispersion and
average prices (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Jensen, 2007; Brown and Goolsbee,
2002). There can be various drivers behind these results. For instance, the literature on
the economics of ICT (e.g., Jorgenson et al., 2005) emphasizes the productivity improve-
ments/cost reductions that stem from the "direct" application of ICT (e.g., the switch
from mail to e-mail). The literature on the economics of telecommunications, in addition,
1Aghion et al. (2005) find an inverted-U shape relationship between the innovative activity and the intensity
of competition. Therefore, according to Aghion et al. (2005), our results imply higher innovative activity
at least for low levels of competition.
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argues that the use of these technologies can improve access to information and reduce
distortions and frictions in the markets (e.g., Leff, 1984; Jensen, 2007).2 Our empirical
findings offer support for these conjectures. They imply that the diffusion of telecom-
munication technologies intensifies the competition in services and goods markets (i.e.,
reduces mark-ups). Meanwhile, given that the latter can matter for allocative and produc-
tive efficiency, our results suggest another driver behind the results of these macro- and
micro-level empirical studies. In this respect, they contribute to the literature on general
ICT and indicate that the economic benefits from a particular type of ICT, telecom-
munication technologies, may come not only from direct use but also from intensified
competition.
This inference can have implications for growth accounting and, specifically, for ac-
counting the contribution of ICT to growth. For example, Oliner et al. (2008) argue that
the contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth in US industries has sharply declined
recently (see also Acemoglu et al., 2014). The authors also offer evidence that increased
competitive pressures explain a significant portion of recent growth. Our results highlight
the possible role of ICT in increased competitive pressures in US industries and suggest
that growth accounting exercises, which do not take into account this role, can understate
the contribution of ICT to growth.
The results of this study can also be interesting for policymakers. They imply that
policies that motivate higher use and wider adoption of telecommunication technologies
can complement competition/antitrust policies.
Having mentioned what we identify in this study, it is also worth mentioning what
we do not intend to identify. The diffusion of telecommunication technologies can reduce
some of the costs of entry and search. However, it is ultimately the corresponding changes
in firms’ and consumers’ behavior that would affect the level of competition. Given the
data we have, we neither can nor aim to identify exactly how those changes happen.
In addition to the literature on the economics of ICT and telecommunications, this
2Ellison and Ellison (2005) summarize this literature and conclude that modern communication technolo-
gies are unlikely to lead to "frictionless commerce." Our results suggest that these technologies reduce
frictions in commerce, although we do not observe mark-ups falling to zero.
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paper is related to studies that examine the determinants of product market competition.
Although competition seems to be an important engine of economic activity, to our best
knowledge, there are very few such studies. There is evidence, for example, that railroad
networks intensified competition in US shipping industry in the 19th century (Holmes
and Schmitz, 2001). There is also evidence that regulations can affect product market
competition (e.g., Griffith et al., 2010; Fisman and Allende, 2010). Our paper is related to
these studies to the extent that telecommunication technologies, similar to the railroad, are
general purpose technologies. Moreover, according to our results, the policies that promote
the diffusion of telecommunication technologies affect the intensity of competition.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
theoretical background, motivates the methodology, and formally defines the objective of
this study. The third section describes the data and their sources. The fourth section
summarizes the results, and the last section concludes.
II Theoretical Background and Methodology
How Telecommunications can Matter
Primarily, we are interested in whether the diffusion of telecommunication technologies
has statistically and economically significant effect on product market competition. In
this section, we briefly discuss how this can happen. We emphasize the channels which
seem to be following from the literature in the most straightforward manner.
The entry and the potential entry of firms and entrepreneurs into a market can
strengthen competition. The costs of entry involve, in particular, the costs of acquir-
ing information about the market (Hurkens and Vulkan, 2001) and the costs of invest-
ments in infrastructure. It seems that it is a common thought in the literature that the
use of telecommunication technologies can reduce the information acquisition costs (e.g.,
Leff, 1984; Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001; Jensen, 2007). The reduction of the information
acquisition costs can further help the entrants to find the best deals for infrastructure in-
vestments. This suggests that the diffusion of telecommunication technologies can reduce
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the costs of entry.
Arguably, the diffusion of telecommunication technologies can also reduce firms’ op-
erating costs since, for example, it can improve information flow and management (e.g.,
Leff, 1984). This can lower the minimum profitable scale of firms and motivate entry.
Another plausible channel operates through the demand for services and goods. The
diffusion of telecommunication technologies can reduce the search costs of consumers, en-
trants, and (downstream) firms. This might increase the intensity of competition because
of better arbitrage (e.g., Waterson, 2003; Pereira, 2005).
The arguments suggesting a positive relation between the diffusion of telecommunica-
tion technologies and the intensity of competition are in line with the conjectures of, for
example, Freund and Weinhold (2004) and Czernich et al. (2011).3 However, they might
not be fully evident. It can be argued as well that the diffusion of telecommunication tech-
nologies can help firms to gain market power. For example, it may help firms to increase
product differentiation through the advertisement of products over the telecommunication
networks, such as the internet. Moreover, lower information acquisition costs can help
firms to learn about the demand and the general market environment. Therefore, they
can help to increase price discrimination and product differentiation. Lower search costs
can also hamper competition. For example, they can increase the likelihood of collusion,
especially if firms’ collusion monitoring improves together with the decline of consumers’
search costs (Campbell et al., 2005).
The possible existence of countervailing channels suggests that it can also be insightful
to learn the sign of the relationship between the diffusion of telecommunication technolo-
gies and product market competition. The diversity of these channels supports our focus
on economy-wide diffusion of telecommunication technologies. For brevity, in the remain-
der of the paper we highlight the potential role of the diffusion of telecommunication
technologies for firm entry since it might be easier to associate with firm behavior and
competition. Importantly, this does not obstruct our further theoretical inference.
3Freund and Weinhold (2004) hypothesize that the diffusion of telecommunication technologies and, in
particular, of internet can reduce the costs of entry. Further, they offer a stylized model, where the
reduction of entry costs induces entry of firms and increases the intensity of competition.
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Methodology
In this paper, we identify the effect of the diffusion of telecommunication technologies
on the competition in services and goods markets. Doing so is not straightforward, how-
ever. According to many theoretical models, the level of competition matters for resource
allocation in the economy. This, in its turn, can affect the country-wide diffusion of
telecommunication technologies creating a reverse link. Moreover, various country-level
(unobservable) variables can affect competition and correlate with the diffusion of telecom-
munication technologies.
Nevertheless, there is an intuitive variation that can be used in order to alleviate these
concerns. The effect of the diffusion of telecommunication technologies on the costs of
entry would be different for industries that depend more heavily on these technologies
compared to industries that depend less. Such variation can arise because the industries
that depend more heavily on telecommunication technologies ceteris paribus would in-
crease their demand for these technologies more due to that diffusion. In turn, in line
with the arguments offered in Leff (1984) or Jensen (2007), the increased demand can
result in more information about the industry. An observation that supports these ar-
guments is that telecommunication technologies are used exactly for transmitting and
disclosing information. A further supporting observation is that nowadays, for instance,
computer producers and retailers seem to be more widely known than the core manufac-
turers, when the former use significantly more of these technologies. According to these
arguments the diffusion will alter the information acquisition costs disproportionately in
industries that depend more heavily on telecommunication technologies. We offer a sim-
ple theoretical model that delivers predictions in line with this inference in the Online
Appendix – Theoretical Model.
Our test looks for exactly such a disparity. We test whether in countries with higher
diffusion of telecommunication technologies the level of product market competition is
different in industries that depend more on these technologies compared to the industries
that depend less. One of the advantages of this test is that we need not explain the
country-level drivers behind the diffusion of telecommunication technologies, market or
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regulatory, and our inference would not depend on country-level models of competition.
Our test also permits country and industry fixed effects, which can be important for
capturing, for instance, institutional and regulatory differences and the variation in the
fixed costs of entry into different industries.
To implement this test, our dependent variable is the level of product market compe-
tition in industry i and country c (averaged over the sample period). After controlling
for industry and country fixed effects, in our empirical specification we should find that
the coefficient on the interaction between the level of the diffusion of telecommunication
technologies and industries’ dependence on those technologies is different from zero. We
also control for the initial share of an industry in a country in total output, which can
capture potential convergence effects. For instance, it can correct for the possibility that
the larger industries in a country experience lower entry rates (Klapper et al., 2006),
which can affect the intensity of competition.
Our (baseline) empirical specification is then
Competitioni,c = α1,i + α2,c (1)
+α3 · (Industry i’s Dependence× The Diffusion in Country c)
+α4 · Industry Sharei,c + ηi,c,
where α1 and α2 are the industry and country fixed effects, and ηi,c is the error term. Our
focus is on the coefficient of the interaction term, α3. This coefficient indicates whether
countries with higher diffusion of telecommunication technologies have different level of
competition in industries that depend more on these technologies. It is positive (nega-
tive if we use an inverse measure for competition) if the diffusion of telecommunication
technologies intensifies competition.
III Measures and Data
We employ data for 21 European countries and focus on the period 1997–2006. We
focus on these countries since they are fully covered by the OECD STAN and Amadeus
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databases, which we use to construct the measures of competition.
The use of data from a rather homogenous set of countries involves trade-offs. It
can eliminate the influence of various unobservable factors on our inference, for example.
However, at the same time it can weaken our inference from cross-country comparisons.
Diffusion of Telecommunication Technologies
Our main measure for the diffusion of telecommunication technologies is the number of
fixed-lines and mobile telephone subscribers per capita in 1997 (Telecom Diffusion).4,5
This measure indicates the adoption and use of telecommunication technologies in the
economy and is extensively used in that context. For example, Ro¨ller and Waverman
(2001) use a similar measure to show that the diffusion of telecommunication technologies
increases the rate of economic growth. Clearly, however, at least some part of the use
measured in this manner will be hard to associate with the competition in services and
goods markets. An example would be a tittle-tattle over the phone. Such a variation in
the data can bias our results toward zero.
We obtain the data for this measure from the ITU and GMID databases. Table A1 in
the Data Appendix offers basic statistics for the main variables, which are described in
detail in Table A2. Tables A3-A10 in the Online Appendix - Further Results and Table
A16 in the Online Appendix - Data offer correlations, basic statistics and descriptions of
additional data.
Dependence on Telecommunication Technologies
In a country, a naive measure of an industry’s dependence on telecommunication tech-
nologies (hereafter, telecom dependence) would be its share of expenditures on telecom-
munications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs. The problem with this
measure is that it reflects both the supply and the demand of those technologies when we
4The use of sample initial value helps us to alleviate further the reverse causality concerns.
5Adding also internet subscribers can lead to significant double counting since, for example, fixed-lines
are used extensively for dial-up and DSL internet. Nevertheless, we have checked that our results remain
qualitatively the same if we use the per capita number of internet subscribers as a measure of diffusion.
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need only the demand.
To alleviate this problem, as in the rest of the literature following Rajan and Zingales
(1998), we identify the industries’ dependence on telecommunication technologies from
US data. Such a measure would be a valid proxy if the rank ordering of the expenditure
share on telecommunications in US industries corresponds to the rank ordering of the
technological dependence of the industries. We need as well that rank ordering to carry
over to the rest of the countries in our sample. From another perspective, if our measure
is noisy, our findings may only suffer from attenuation bias.
The data for the share of expenditures on telecommunications out of total expenditures
on intermediate inputs in US industries are at the 2-digit industry level and come from
the input-output tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The original data
are in NAICS 2007. We transform these data to ISIC rev. 3.1 (hereafter, ISIC), in order
to align them with the rest of our data, and exclude the industries that are expected to
have a large state involvement (80, 85, 90, and 91 of ISIC).6 Further, we average these
data over the period 1997–2006 and use the average as a measure for dependence.7
To gain confidence about the validity of our measure, we perform a simple ANOVA
exercise on our data for the share of expenditures on telecommunications out of total
expenditures on intermediate inputs in US industries. Industry-level variation accounts
for 99.48% of the total variation, and time variation accounts for only 0.52%. This
provides support for the validity of our measure suggesting that technological differences
are the likely driver behind its variation. Further, we obtain the share of expenditures
on telecommunications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in the industries
from the countries in our sample from the OECD STAN database. These data have a
structure similar to the 2-digit ISIC, though they are more aggregated and are available
only for 1995, 2000, and 2005. We take the average of these three years and compute rank
correlations between our dependence measure and these shares. The rank correlations are
6Our results are robust to their inclusion.
7Our results remain qualitatively the same when we use expenditures on telecommunications relative to
output (the so-called "technical coefficients") and the coefficients of inverse Leontief matrix as measures
of dependence (see Table A11 in the Online Appendix - Further Results).
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highly significant and range from 0.6 to 0.9 with a mean of 0.8, which provides further
support for the validity of our measure (see Table A8 in the Online Appendix - Further
Results).
Intensity of Competition and Industry Share
We use five measures of product market competition averaged over the period 1997–2006.
These measures are the most widely applied in the literature.
Following Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005), our primary (inverse) measure of
product market competition is the price cost margin (PCM). Under the assumption of
constant marginal cost, it is the empirical analogue of the Lerner index. Therefore, it tends
to be the reference competition measure and is widely applied in the recent empirical work.
Using industry-level data, PCM is a weighted sum of Lerner indices in the industry
across firms, where the weights are the market shares of the firms. In industry i, country
c, and at time t, PCM is given by
PCMi,c,t =
(Revenue− V ariable cost)i,c,t
Revenuei,c,t
,
where the variable costs include labor compensation and expenditures on intermediate
inputs.8
Our second (inverse) measure for the intensity of competition is the profit elasticity
(PE) introduced by Boone (2008). Profit elasticity captures the relation between profits
and efficiency. This relation can be argued to become steeper as competition intensifies
since in a more competitive environment the same percentage increase in costs reduces
the profits more. In a given pair of industry and country and for all time periods, the PE
is estimated using the following empirical specification:
8We follow Nickell (1996) and Oliner et al. (2008) while specifying PCM. In contrast, if we followed Aghion
et al. (2005), we would have in the numerator net operating surplus minus financial costs. We do not
prefer that measure since we have fewer data for it. Meanwhile, it is highly correlated with our measure
(ρ = 0.7), and our results are qualitatively the same with it.
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lnProfitf,t = β1,f + β2,t + β3,t ln
(
V ariable cost
Revenue
)
f,t
+ ηf,t, (2)
where f indexes firms, and ηf,t is an error term. The PE in industry i, country c, and
time t is the estimated coefficient βˆ3,i,c,t.
The third (inverse) measure is the Herfindahl index (HI), which is defined as the sum
of the squared market shares of firms within an industry. Formally,
HIi,c,t =
Ni,c,t∑
f=1
(
Revenuef,i,c,t∑Ni,j,t
f=1 Revenuef,i,c,t
)2
,
where N is the number of firms. The fourth one is the market share (MS) of the four
largest firms in terms of revenues in each industry. Formally,
MSi,c,t =
∑4
f˜=1Revenuef˜ ,i,c,t∑Ni,c,t
f=1 Revenuef,i,c,t
,
where f˜ = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the four largest firms in industry i and country c at time t.
The fifth measure of competition is the number of firms in each industry, Ni,c,t. It
may seem to be the most simplistic and disputable. It may relatively firmly approximate
the intensity of competition in situations close to symmetric equilibrium.
Even though these measures are widely applied, in certain cases they may not fully
reflect the intensity of product market competition. For instance, when the competition
intensifies from more aggressive conduct, some firms may leave the market. In such a
situation the Herfindahl index, being a concentration measure, can fail, suggesting that
the intensity of competition has decreased. In the same situation a similar problem can
arise with the market share of the four largest firms when, for instance, one or several
of the largest firms leave the market.9 Meanwhile, the price cost margin may fail in
such a case when, for instance, inefficient firms leave the market. This would increase
the weight of more efficient firms and, therefore, can increase the price cost margin (for
further discussion see Boone, 2008). Given its definition, this problem is not present,
9Another possible criticism that applies to concentration measures such as MS and HI is that these are
more tied to the geographic and product boundaries of the market in which the firms operate.
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however, in the profit elasticity measure of competition. Nevertheless, given that all our
measures have a somewhat different nature (i.e., can reflect different forces behind the
intensity of competition), it seems reasonable to use them for robustness checks of our
results. It is worth noting also that averaging over time would alleviate some of these
concerns since we focus on a rather long-term level of competition.
We take the data for the price cost margin and the number of firms from the OECD
STAN database and use the Amadeus database for the remaining measures of competition.
The Amadeus database has several features that need to be highlighted. First, in this
database there is virtually no data for the financial intermediation, insurance and pension
funding industries. Therefore, our analysis for competition measures constructed using
the Amadeus database excludes those industries. Second, this database does not cover
the universe of firms and may not have a representative sample. For instance, according
to Klapper et al. (2006), it tends to overstate the percentage of large firms. This can
affect the competition measures identified from that database.
Our industry and country fixed effects are likely to reduce such biases; nevertheless, we
perform several robustness checks. Klapper et al. (2006) compare the data from Amadeus
with data from Eurostat in terms of the within-industry distribution of the size of the
firms and keep only the industries and countries which are sufficiently close to the data
from Eurostat. We have checked that all our results hold for the sample of countries and
industries which were employed in Klapper et al. (2006). We have also calculated the price
cost margin from firm-level data from the Amadeus database and checked that all our
results hold for the sample of countries and industries where this measure is sufficiently
close to its OECD STAN counterpart.10
Finally, the share of an industry in a country in total (business) output in 1997 is
obtained from the OECD STAN database.
10Online Appendix - Data Cleaning describes further that database and offers our data cleaning procedure.
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IV Results
In column (1) of Table 1, we present our main result from the baseline specification (1),
which we estimate using the least squares method. The dependent variable is our main
(inverse) measure of intensity of product market competition, PCM, averaged over the pe-
riod 1997–2006. Meanwhile, the interaction term consists of the logarithm of the diffusion
measure in 1997, Telecom Diffusion, and the measure of dependence on telecommunication
technologies, Telecom Dependence.
Table 1: The Main Result and the Results for Alternative Competition Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCM PE HI MS logN
Telecom Dependence -2.66*** -29.67** -1.58*** -1.88*** 17.05***
× Telecom Diffusion (0.37) (12.47) (0.54) (0.62) (3.92)
Industry Share 0.69*** 17.35*** -0.25 -0.59* 10.55***
(0.26) (4.81) (0.21) (0.34) (2.15)
Observations 902 844 876 876 818
R2 0.72 0.52 0.59 0.73 0.93
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specification (1) for all our measures
of product market competition. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix for the definitions and
sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the
least squares estimation method. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the
1% level. Given that smaller values of PCM correspond to higher competition intensity,
this indicates that in industries that depend more on telecommunication technologies,
competition is more intensive in countries with higher diffusion of these technologies. The
diffusion, therefore, has a positive effect on the intensity of competition in the services
and goods markets.11
Since we have a difference-in-differences estimate, one way to compute the magnitude
of our result is as follows. We take the countries that rank in the 25th and 75th per-
11In the Online Appendix - Further Results, we also find that our results are stronger in countries with
higher quality of telecommunications infrastructure as measured by the broadband subscriptions.
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centiles of the distribution of Telecom Diffusion and compute the difference between the
logarithms of the diffusion levels in these countries. The countries are Estonia (25th) and
France (75th) in our sample. Further, we take the industries that rank in the 25th and
75th percentiles of the distribution of dependence on telecommunication technologies and
compute the difference between the dependence levels. In our sample, these industries
are Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment (25th) and Real Estate Activities (75th).
Finally, we compute
αˆ3 ×∆Telecom Dependence×∆ log (Telecom Diffusion),
where ∆ stands for the difference operator between the 75th and 25th percentiles. The
computed number is -0.02. This means that the difference in PCM (the intensity of com-
petition) between Real Estate Activities and Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment
is lower (higher) by 0.02 in France as compared to Estonia. This difference is sizable and
constitutes the 11% of the sample mean of PCM (0.19).
In an attempt to rule out other explanations for our main result, we conduct a range
of robustness checks.
Alternative Measures for Competition
We estimate our baseline specification (1) for the remaining four competition measures
in order to check whether our results are robust in terms of the competition measure.
Columns (2)-(5) in Table 1 report the results where, all else equal, the dependent variable
is correspondingly the profit elasticity, the Herfindahl index, the market share of the four
largest firms, and the logarithm of the number of firms in an industry. All the estimates
of the coefficients on the interaction terms have the expected signs and are significant at
least at the 5% level.
We further report the estimation results exclusively for PCM. We have checked, how-
ever, that all our results stay qualitatively the same for the remaining measures of com-
petition.
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Alternative Measures for Diffusion and Dependence
Our measure of the diffusion of telecommunication technologies may not fully reflect the
use and the quality of these technologies, which can matter for the costs associated with
information transmission. For a robustness check of our results, we also use the revenue of
the telecommunications industry per capita as a measure of diffusion [Telecom Diffusion
(Revenue)]. This measure can better account for the use and quality. However, from the
between-country-comparison perspective, it may fail to correctly reflect the amount of
telecommunication services produced since it could be higher, for example, simply because
prices are higher.12 We obtain the data for the revenue of the telecommunications industry
from the GMID and ITU databases.
Column (1) in Table 2 offers the results where we use the logarithm of the Telecom
Diffusion (Revenue) in 1997. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the
1% level, which complements the result reported in column (1) of Table 1.
Further, our measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies might fail to
identify the technological ranking of industries correctly. Although according to the rank
correlation tests, most likely, this is not the case, we perform robustness checks.
For a robustness check, we employ the shares of expenditures on telecommunications
out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in industries in Japan. Similar to the
US, this country has well-developed ICT sector and relatively high telecommunication
technologies diffusion. At the same time, it tends to have a different industrial composition
than the United States, which would be another type of robustness check.
The data for this measure were obtained from the input-output tables from the OECD
STAN database. These data are slightly more aggregated than the data for our main mea-
sure and are only for 1995, 2000, and 2005. We average the share of Japanese industries’
expenditures on telecommunications over these three years and use it as a measure of
dependence in our baseline specification (1).
12This problem may be alleviated with a purchasing power parity index for the telecommunications industry.
We are not aware of any good source of such data. Nevertheless, we have checked that our results are
qualitatively not different if we adjust revenues by the price of a 3-minute local mobile phone call.
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Column (2) in Table 2 reports the results. The estimate on the interaction term
is again negative, which reaffirms our main result. However, it is somewhat smaller in
absolute value. To check this result, we calculate a measure of dependence using data
from the OECD STAN database on US industries. With this measure, the estimate of
the coefficient on the interaction term is reported in Column (3) of Table 2. It is very
close to the estimate that we obtain using the measure identified from the data for Japan.
Moreover, it is quite close to the main result although it implies a somewhat smaller
effect. It is different, however, since the OECD STAN database has a higher industry
aggregation.13
In Column (4) of Table 2, we use as a measure of dependence the country-time average
of the expenditure share on telecommunications in industries in our sample of European
countries. The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term is not qualitatively
different from the main one.
We further report exclusively the results for our main measures of diffusion and de-
pendence. We have checked, however, that all our results are qualitatively the same for
these alternatives.
Non-parametric Estimator
In our difference-in-differences estimation, we essentially divide the countries into high
diffusion (HDIFF) and low diffusion (LDIFF) and the industries into high dependence
(HDEP) and low dependence (LDEP). Abstracting from the control variables, our esti-
mate is
[HDEP(HDIFF)-LDEP(HDIFF)]-[HDEP(LDIFF)-LDEP(LDIFF)],
which captures the average effect only. The effect that we compute with this non-
parametric estimator is -0.03. This result reassures us that the effect we have identified
previously is generally present in all countries and industries.
13We have also estimated the specification (1) using the US measures for the overlapping sample of industries
of the BEA and OECD STAN databases. The estimates are very close: -1.80 (0.30) and -1.09 (0.20),
respectively.
18
Alternative Explanations: Do we capture integration processes?
Further, we test whether our results are robust to various sample restrictions. First,
we restrict our sample to 2000–2006 to check whether the market integration processes
in the European Union affect our results. Column (5) in Table 2 reports the results
from the baseline specification. The dependent variable is PCM and, together with the
measure of telecom dependence, it is averaged over the period 2000–2006. The measure of
telecommunication technologies diffusion and the industry share variable are from 2000.
The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and highly significant.14
Its magnitude has increased in comparison with the main result, but not considerably.
This suggests that the integration processes are not likely to be the drivers behind our
results.
Alternative Explanations: Are new members of the European Union different?
The former transition countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland,
and Hungary, which joined the European Union in 2004, can be different from the remain-
ing countries in our sample. In these countries, the privatization process has resulted in
the emergence of a large number of private firms (Klapper et al., 2006). Moreover, these
countries have gone through large structural/industry changes. The latter can affect the
intensity of competition, whereas the former can affect the patterns of telecommunication
technologies use. We want to make sure that our results are not driven by these factors.
Column (6) in Table 2 reports the results when we exclude these countries from the
sample. The estimate of the coefficient is not significantly different from the main estimate
according to the Chow test.
14Our results are virtually the same if we consider the periods 1998–1999 and 1996–2005. Our results also
do not change when we add to our specification the interaction between Telecom Dependence and the
ratio of imports and exports to GDP, which can capture integration processes. Similarly, they do not
change when we add the interaction between Telecom Diffusion and the ratio of industry-level imports
and exports to output. (The data for imports and exports are from OECD STAN and OECD Stat.)
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Alternative Explanations: Are the services industries different?
The processes behind our results may be different in the services industries compared
to the goods/manufacturing industries. This is because services products can be more
easily marketed and delivered over telecommunication networks. Therefore, in line with
the literature on electronic versus regular marketplaces, it might be reasonable to expect
that the role of the consumers’ search costs is different for the services industries. These
costs can be important since they can affect the intensity of competition (Campbell et al.,
2005; Pereira, 2005). Although theory does not have a clear-cut inference on the direction
of the effect, empirical studies point out that lowering consumers’ search costs increases
the intensity of competition (e.g., Brown and Goolsbee, 2002).
Column (7) of Table 2 reports the results when we restrict the sample to the services
industries. The estimate of the coefficient is essentially the same as our main estimate.
In turn, the simple Chow test suggests that there is no significant difference between the
services and the goods industries.
Alternative Explanations: Are the industries, that use telecommunications the least, dif-
ferent?
We have also checked that our results are not qualitatively different from the main result
for the industries that, most likely, affect the diffusion of telecommunication technologies
the least. To identify such industries, we take the interaction between the variables
Industry Share and Telecom Dependence and for a country take those industries that
have a value lower than the median in that country.
Column (8) of Table 2 reports the results. The coefficient for the industries that
have lower-than-median interaction between Telecom Dependence and Industry Share is
essentially the same as our main result. This exercise suggests that our results are not
likely to be driven by reverse causality. Nevertheless, we continue to explore such a
possibility.
20
Reverse Causality
Our inference would be incorrect if a third factor is responsible for the intensity of compe-
tition and is correlated with the interaction between dependence and diffusion measures.
In this section, we attempt to rule out such an explanation of our results.
First, we try to alleviate further the reverse causality concerns and instrument the
pre-determined level of the diffusion of telecommunication technologies. The set of in-
struments that we use consists of dummy variables for country groups: countries that
joined the European Union in 2004, Scandinavian countries, and France–Germany. The
first set of countries inherited (antiquated) telecommunications infrastructure from their
socialist regimes. Scandinavian countries, in turn, were very effective in promoting uni-
versal access via state control and subsidies after deregulation. Meanwhile, France and
Germany had the best access to mobile technologies through industry leaders such as La
Compagnie Ge´ne´rale d’E´lectricite´ and Siemens. Column (1) in Table 3 reports the results.
They are no different from our main results.15
Our country-group-level instrumental variables may not solve the endogeneity prob-
lem, however. It might be that they are correlated with some omitted variables and
therefore do not satisfy the exclusion restrictions.
Omitted Variables: Do we identify other costs of entry?
According to, for example, Klapper et al. (2006), the country groups that comprise our
instruments are quite different in terms of variables that matter for entry (and potential
entry) and for the size distribution of firms and, thus, for the intensity of competition.
Following Klapper et al. (2006) and Scarpetta et al. (2002), these variables are the bureau-
cratic costs of entry, product market regulation, financial development, the regulation of
labor, property rights, and human capital development (or the availability of qualified per-
sonnel). To the extent that the diffusion of telecommunication technologies is correlated
with these variables (e.g., because it reflects the business environment), and
15Ro¨ller and Waverman (2001) use the waiting list for main lines per capita as an instrumental variable.
Our results are robust to using this variable together with our instrumental variables and separately.
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the rank of telecom dependence is correlated with the rank of the industries that are
mostly affected by these variables, our inference would be incorrect.
We follow the literature to find measures for these country-level variables and to
identify the ranking of industries according to the effect these variables should have on
them (i.e., on the competition in those industries). We then include the interactions
between these variables in the baseline specification.
We obtain the measure and the data for the bureaucratic costs of entry from Djankov
et al. (2002). To measure the country-wide market regulation, we use the product market
regulation indicator from OECD Stat. We measure the level of financial development as
stock market capitalization over GDP and take the data from the WDI database. The
measure and data for the regulation of labor are from Botero et al. (2004). Further,
the property rights index constructed by the Heritage Foundation is used to proxy for
property rights and their enforcement. Given availability, the data for these measures are
for 1999, 1997, 1997, 1998, and 1997 respectively. Finally, we use the average years of
schooling for the population older than 25 as a measure of human capital development.
The data are for 1995, and we obtain them from the Barro-Lee tables, the World Bank.
Table A2 in the Data Appendix offers detailed descriptions for these measures.
We need also the ranking of the industries according to the effect of these variables on
them. The bureaucratic costs of entry, according to Klapper et al. (2006), have a higher
impact on entry in "naturally" high-entry industries. It would be reasonable to expect
that product market regulation matters in these industries in a similar way. Meanwhile,
financial development, according to Rajan and Zingales (1998), has a higher impact on
the creation of new establishments in industries that depend more on external finance.
The strictness of labor regulation, in turn, could be expected to have a disproportionate
impact on the industries that have high labor intensity. Further, property rights and
human capital development would have a disproportionate impact on the industries that
have high R&D intensity.
We use the measure and the data of Klapper et al. (2006) to identify the naturally
high-entry industries. It is defined as the percentage of new corporations in an industry
23
in the US, and it is averaged over the period 1998–1999 in that paper. We take the
measures and the data for dependence on external finance and R&D intensity from Bena
and Ondko (2012).16 The first is defined as the industry median of the average of the ratio
of capital expenditures minus cash flows from operations to capital expenditures over the
period 1996–2005. Meanwhile, R&D intensity is defined as the industry median of the
ratio of averages of R&D expenditures to capital expenditures over the period 1996–2005.
As a measure for labor intensity we use the ratio of the number of employees to output in
US industries averaged over the period 1997–2006. We take these data from the OECD
STAN database.
In order to check whether any of these variables matter for our results, we create an
interaction term and add it to the baseline specification (1). Columns (2)-(7) of Table
3 report the results. Clearly, the fact that we use data for the years 1999 and 1998 for
bureaucratic costs of entry and market regulation can raise further endogeneity concerns.
To alleviate these concerns, we have checked that our results are no different when we use
data for competition, dependence, and diffusion measures from the period 2000–2006, for
example.
The coefficient on the interaction term between the measures of dependence and dif-
fusion remains virtually the same in all cases. It somewhat, though, reduces in absolute
value when we insert the interaction between measures of labor regulation and labor inten-
sity, column (5). However, this effect is neither significant nor driven by that interaction
term. The coefficient on the interaction term in the baseline specification is virtually the
same on the sub-sample where we have observations of the measures of labor regulation
and intensity. In turn, the signs of the coefficients of the additional interaction terms tend
to be intuitive, although the estimates are not significant.17
16We are grateful to Peter Ondko for sharing his data with us.
17It might also be argued that the ranking of the industries according to their dependence on telecommu-
nication technologies corresponds to the ranking of industries according to the effect these variables have
on them. In Table A13 in the Online Appendix - Further Results, we explore this hypothesis. In that
table, we also report the results when in addition to our main interaction term we include the interaction
of Telecom Dependence with a market regulation indicator for the telecommunications industry.
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All these additional interaction terms, as well as our main interaction term, may proxy
for the business/competitive environment in the country. Another rough way to proxy for
that, together with the entrepreneurial culture in the country, is to include an interaction
term of the Telecom Dependence variable with the average intensity of competition for
the country. Column (1) of Table 4 reports the result when we include such an interaction
term in our baseline specification. The coefficient of our main interest remains unaltered.
Table 4: Specification Check - Additional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Growth Growth Average
Environment Potential Potential EU Growth
Telecom Dependence -2.80*** -2.24*** -2.57*** -2.37***
× Telecom Diffusion (0.39) (0.43) (0.37) (0.47)
Telecom Dependence 13.06
× Business Environment (8.80)
Growth Potential -0.36**
× Telecom Diffusion (0.16)
Growth Potential EU -0.43***
× Telecom Diffusion (0.12)
Average Growth 0.11***
(0.04)
Industry Share 0.69*** 0.68** 0.68*** 0.93**
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.38)
Observations 902 902 902 783
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73
Note: This table reports the results from specifications that augment the baseline with
additional interaction terms. The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM.
See Table A2 in the Data Appendix for the definitions and sources of variables. All
regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation
method. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Another concern is that it can be more valuable to obtain information about the prod-
ucts and prices in more competitive markets, and consumers might form their demand
for telecommunications accordingly. The exercise offered above, together with our instru-
mental variable estimation results and results for industries which use telecommunications
the least, suggests that this is likely not to be a major issue. Nonetheless, we also check
25
that our results remain unaltered for industries which have lower than median level of
competition in their countries, but these results are not reported.
Omitted Variables: Do we identify the growth potential of the industries?
It could also be that the measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies iden-
tifies the industries that have high growth potential. Meanwhile, such industries could
depend on the availability of modern technologies, which might be proxied by the diffusion
of telecommunication technologies, and face tougher competition due to attractiveness.
We follow Fisman and Love (2007) and use the growth rate of output of US industries
averaged over the period 1998–2007 as a proxy for the growth potential of the industries.
The data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This proxy seems to be the most
appropriate given the relatively low market imperfections in the United States. However,
it could fail if there are important taste differences in the US compared to our sample
countries. Therefore, we also use the growth rates of output of industries in the three
most developed (measured by GDP per capita in 1997) European countries in our sample
averaged over the countries and the 1998–2007 period.
We interact the proxies for growth potential with the measure of diffusion of telecom-
munication technologies and include the interactions in the baseline specification. Columns
(2) and (3) of Table 4 report the results. The estimate of the coefficient on the interac-
tion between Telecom Dependence and Telecom Diffusion stays virtually unaffected. The
estimated coefficients on the interactions between Telecom Diffusion and the measures
of growth potential are negative. This suggests that in countries where the diffusion of
telecommunication technologies is higher, the competition is more intensive in industries
with higher growth potential. An explanation for this can be that industries with high
growth potential depend more on such (modern) technologies (see Table A10 in the Online
Appendix - Further Results for the correlation between the measures of growth poten-
tial and dependence on telecommunication technologies). Therefore, a higher diffusion of
telecommunication technologies reduces (potential) entry costs in these industries more
than in low growth potential industries.
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As a final check, we also include in our baseline specification the growth rates of
industries in the European countries from our sample averaged over the period 1998–
2007. We report the result in column (4) of Table 4. Our main result stays virtually
unaffected. Our main result also stays unaffected if we include all these additional terms
at once, but these results are not reported. (We offer results from further robustness
check exercises in Tables A11-A14 in the Online Appendix - Further Results.)
V Conclusions
In this study, we use industry-country-level data in order to identify the effect of the wider
adoption and more intensive use (diffusion) of telecommunication technologies on the com-
petition in services and goods markets. Taken together, our results offer robust evidence
that the diffusion of telecommunication technologies significantly intensifies competition.
It does so especially in the industries that depend more on these technologies.
According to the theory and empirical evidence, the intensity of product market com-
petition matters for allocative and productive efficiency. Therefore, our results highlight a
mechanism for how the use of a particular type of ICT, telecommunication technologies,
can contribute to economic performance. This complements, for example, the produc-
tivity improvement mechanism that tends to be extensively emphasized in the literature.
From this perspective, our results can have implications for accounting the contribution of
ICT to growth in standard growth accounting frameworks, which do not take into account
this effect on competition.
Our findings also suggest that the policies intended to promote the diffusion of telecom-
munication technologies can complement competition policies.
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A Data Appendix
Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Country-level
B.Entry Cost 20 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.86
Business Environment 21 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.23
Financial Development 21 0.28 0.23 0.02 0.79
Human Capital 21 9.48 1.28 6.82 11.45
Labor Regulation 20 0.61 0.15 0.28 0.81
Market Regulation 18 2.25 0.65 1.07 3.97
Property Rights 21 0.77 0.13 0.50 0.90
Telecom Diffusion 21 0.61 0.23 0.22 1.06
Telecom Diffusion (Revenue) 21 381.16 213.09 85.44 863.10
Industry-level
Entry Rate 44 6.15 1.76 1.74 10.73
Ext. Fin. Dependence 46 0.32 0.72 -1.55 2.95
Growth Potential 47 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.09
Growth Potential EU 47 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.22
Labor Intensity 24 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
R&D Intensity 46 0.70 1.16 0.00 4.17
Telecom Dependence 47 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06
Telecom Dependence EU 30 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08
Telecom Dependence JP 30 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09
Telecom Dependence (OECD) 30 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10
Industry-country-level
Average Growth 788 0.05 0.07 -0.61 0.48
HI 928 0.14 0.17 0.00 1.00
Industry Share 926 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.24
logN 863 7.24 2.63 1.39 13.49
MS 928 0.45 0.27 0.02 1.00
PCM 902 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.89
PE 892 -5.29 3.47 -20.56 -0.03
Note: This table reports basic statistics for the key variables used in the paper. All
variables and data sources are defined in detail in Table A2.
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Table A2: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Variable Name Definition and Source
Country-level Variables
B.Entry Cost The bureaucratic cost of obtaining legal status to operate a
firm as the share of per capita GDP in 1999. Source: Djankov
et al. (2002).
Business Environ-
ment
PCM averaged over industries in each country. The data
are for 1997. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
OECD STAN.
Financial Develop-
ment
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in 1997.
Source: WDI.
Human Capital The average years of schooling of the population 25 years of
age or over in 1995. Source: Barro-Lee tables, World Bank.
Labor Regulation Index of labor regulations in 1997. It takes into account job
security, the conditions of employment, and the provisions
in laws regarding alternative employment contracts. Source:
Botero et al. (2004).
Market Regulation Product market regulation indicator in 1998. It takes into
account the public control of business, bureaucratic barriers
to entrepreneurship, trade, and investment. Source: OECD
Stat.
Property Rights Property rights index in 1997. It measures the protection of
private property in a country. Source: The Heritage Founda-
tion.
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Table A2 – (Continued)
Variable Name Definition and Source
Telecom Diffusion The sum of fixed-lines and mobile telephone subscribers per
capita in 1997. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
ITU and GMID.
Telecom Diffusion
(Revenue)
The revenue of the telecommunications industry per capita (in
2000 US$) in 1997. Source: Authors’ calculations using data
from ITU and GMID.
Industry-level Variables
Entry Rate The percentage of new corporations (firms that are not more
than one year old) in US industries, averaged over the period
1998–1999. Source: Klapper et al. (2006) using Dun & Brad-
street.
Ext. Fin. Depen-
dence
The median of the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash
flow from operations over capital expenditures in US indus-
tries (where both are averaged over the period 1996–2005 for
a firm). Source: Bena and Ondko (2012) using Compustat.
Growth Potential The annual growth rate of real output of US industries, aver-
aged over the period 1998–2007. Source: Authors’ calculations
using data from BEA.
Growth Potential EU The annual growth rate of real output of industries from the
three most developed European countries in terms of real GDP
per capita in 1997, averaged over the countries and the pe-
riod 1998–2007. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
OECD STAN.
30
Table A2 – (Continued)
Variable Name Definition and Source
Labor Intensity The ratio of the number of employees to production (in $1000)
in US industries, averaged over the period 1997–2006. Source:
Authors’ calculations using data from OECD STAN.
R&D Intensity The ratio of median R&D expenditures over median capital
expenditures in US industries. Both components are averaged
over the period 1996–2005. Source: Bena and Ondko (2012)
using Compustat.
Telecom Dependence The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out
of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in US industries,
averaged over the period 1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calcu-
lations using data from BEA, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
EU
The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of
total expenditures on intermediate inputs in industries in Eu-
ropean countries from our sample, averaged over countries and
the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Source: Authors’ calculations
using data from OECD STAN, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
JP
The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out
of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in industries in
Japan, averaged over the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Source:
Authors’ calculations using data from OECD STAN, I-O ta-
bles.
Telecom Dependence
(OECD)
The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out
of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in US industries,
averaged over the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Source: Authors’
calculations using data from OECD STAN, I-O tables.
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Table A2 – (Continued)
Variable Name Definition and Source
Industry-country-level Variables
Average Growth The annual growth rate of real output of industries from Euro-
pean countries in our sample, averaged over the period 1998–
2007. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD
STAN.
HI Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of squared market
shares of firms within an industry, averaged over the period
1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
Amadeus.
Industry Share The ratio of output in an industry in a country to the total
(business) output in the country in 1997. Source: Authors’
calculations using data from OECD STAN.
Least Telecom Users Dummy variable that takes value 1 for an industry-country
pair if the interaction between Industry Share and Telecom
Dependence is lower than the median in the country, and
zero otherwise. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
OECD STAN and BEA.
logN The logarithm of the number of firms in an industry, averaged
over the period 1997–2006. Source: OECD STAN.
MS Market share of the four largest firms in an industry, averaged
over the period 1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calculations us-
ing data from Amadeus.
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Table A2 – (Continued)
Variable Name Definition and Source
PCM Price cost margin is computed as revenue (sales) minus inter-
mediate cost and labor costs divided by sales, averaged over
the period 1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calculations using
data from OECD STAN.
PE Profit elasticity in an industry-country pair is the estimate of
the coefficient β3 in the empirical specification (3), averaged
over 1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
Amadeus.
Country Sample:
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic1, Denmark2, Estonia1, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary1, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway2, Poland1, Portugal, Slovakia1,
Slovenia1, Spain, Sweden2, and the UK. (1 new European Union member countries; 2 three
most developed European countries in terms of GDP per capita in 1997.)
Industry Sample (ISIC rev. 3.1):
10, 11, 13-36, 40, 41, 45, 50-52, 55, 60-63, 65-67, 70-74, 92, and 93. (Industries 65-67 are
not in the sample for competition measures constructed using Amadeus data. In OECD
STAN data, industries 10-14, 15-16, 17-19, 21-22, 36-37, 40-41, 50-52, 60-63, and 65-67
are merged. Further, these data do not contain industries 92 and 93.)
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Online Appendix to The Impact of
Telecommunication Technologies on Competition
in Services and Goods Markets: Empirical
Evidence
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B Online Appendix – Theoretical Model
In this section we present a minimalist deterministic model that delivers predictions in
line with our inference. There are two intermediate goods industries which produce dif-
ferentiated goods {x1} and {x2}. Final goods (Y ) are produced with a Cobb-Douglas
production technology:
Y = λYX
σ1
1 X
σ2
2 , (3)
where σ1, σ2 > 0 and σ1 + σ2 = 1, λY > 0, and X1 and X2 are CES aggregates of the
intermediate goods,
Xi =
(
Ni∑
f=1
x
εi−1
εi
i,f
) εi
εi−1
, i = 1, 2. (4)
Here i indexes the industries, N stands for the number of firms, f indexes the firms, and
ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the products of the firms in these industries.
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Normalizing aggregate demand to 1 and taking final goods as the numeraire, it follows
that the demand for the product of firm j ∈ {1, ..., Ni} in industry i ∈ {1, 2}, xi,j, is
pxi,jxi,j = σi
x
εi−1
εi
i,j∑Ni
f=1 x
εi−1
εi
i,f
, (5)
where pxi,j is the price of xi,j.
Further, x1 and x2 are produced using telecommunication technologies (T ) and some
other good (L) with Cobb-Douglas production technologies,
xi = λiT
γi
i L
1−γi
i , (6)
where λi > 0 and γi ∈ (0, 1) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The parameters γ1 and γ2 are the output
elasticities of the telecommunication technologies input in industry 1 and 2, respectively.
In this sense, they measure the dependence on this input. We assume that γ1 > γ2:
Industry 1 depends on telecommunication technologies more than industry 2.
For simplicity, we assume that firms live for one period. Meanwhile, the entrants
pay a fixed cost Fi for entry into the respective industry, and there is free entry into
the industries (where Fi < σi/εi for i = 1, 2 since aggregate demand is equal to 1). In
order to cover the costs of entry, these firms set prices and engage in quantity (Cournot)
competition. In an industry, each firm internalizes its effect on the demand for the goods
of the remaining firms in the industry.
The problem of a firm j ∈ {1, ..., Ni} in industry i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
pii,j = max
Ti,j ,Li,j
{
pxi,jxi,j − pTTi,j − pLLi,j − Fi
}
(7)
s.t.
(5) ,
where pT and pL are the prices of T and L.
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It follows from firm j’s problem that its demands for T and L are given by
pT = pxi,j
(
1− 1
ei,j
)
∂xi,j
∂Ti,j
, (8)
pL = pxi,j
(
1− 1
ei,j
)
∂xi,j
∂Li,j
, (9)
where ei,j is firm j’s perceived elasticity of substitution between goods in its industry:
ei,j = εi
1 + (εi − 1) x
εi−1
εi
i,j∑Ni
f=1 x
εi−1
εi
i,f

−1
.
In this framework competitive pressure in an industry can be expressed in terms of
the Lerner index (LI). For firm j from industry i this index can be derived from (6), (8),
and (9). It is given by
LIi,j =
1
ei,j
.
Ceteris paribus, in an industry, it declines with actual elasticity of substitution ε and the
number of firms N .
Hereafter we assume that symmetric equilibrium holds in each of the industries. The
perceived elasticity of substitution can be then rewritten as
ei =
εi
1 + εi−1
Ni
.
In turn, the demands for T and L in each industry can be written as
NipTTi = σiγi
(
1− 1
ei
)
, (10)
NipLLi = σi (1− γi)
(
1− 1
ei
)
. (11)
Given that there is free entry, the number of firms in each industry is determined by
a zero profit condition pii = 0. Using (5), (7), (10), and (11) it can be easily shown that
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this condition is equivalent to
σi
1
Ni
= σi
(
1− 1
ei
)
1
Ni
+ Fi.
Therefore, the number of firms in each industry is
Ni =
σi
εi
+
√(
σi
εi
)2
+ 4Fiσi
εi−1
εi
2Fi
. (12)
From this expression, it is straightforward to show that the number of firms N in
each industry declines with F . This implies that lowering Fi reduces LIi or, equivalently,
increases competition in industry i. After tedious algebra, it is also possible to show that
increasing elasticity of substitution εi reduces LIi.
In turn, allocations of T and L can be solved using (10), (11), and market clearing
conditions:
N1T1 +N2T2 = T,
N1L1 +N2L2 = L.
These allocations are given by
NiTi =
1
1 + γ−i
γi
σ−i
σi
(
1− 1
e−i
)(
1− 1
ei
)−1T,
NiLi =
1
1 + 1−γ−i
1−γi
σ−i
σi
(
1− 1
e−i
)(
1− 1
ei
)−1L.
Let industries have equal shares (σi ≡ σ), then increasing T increases N1T1 more than
N2T2. This result holds because industry 1 depends on telecommunication technologies
more than industry 2 (γ1 > γ2). It is the central implication of our model and motivates
our difference-in-differences strategy. What remains to answer is: how can the higher use
of telecommunications in an industry affect competition in that industry?
We follow Leff (1984) and Jensen (2007) and assume that the higher use of telecommu-
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nications in an industry increases the amount of information flows in/about that industry.
Further, we follow, for example, Freund and Weinhold (2004) and Jensen (2007) and as-
sume that this generates cost saving externality so that Fi = Fi (NiTi) and F
′
i < 0. This
implies that N1 increases more than N2. Therefore, increasing T increases competition
more in the industry that depends more on telecommunication technologies (industry 1).
In an industry, firms might also use telecommunication technologies to increase prod-
uct differentiation and reduce competition [i.e., εi = εi (NiTi) and ε
′
i < 0]. In such a case,
the effect of increasing T on competitive pressure depends on the functional forms of ε (.)
and F (.); therefore, a priori it can be ambiguous.
Clearly, F can also be interpreted as operational fixed costs (e.g., management costs)
since we assume that firms live for one period. These costs can include the costs of
information flows within firms. Higher use of telecommunications can reduce the costs
of information flows. This line of logic implies that F would decline more in industry 1
than in industry 2 if T increases since, given the number of firms, T1 increases more with
T than T2. Therefore, higher T would facilitate higher competition in industry 1 than in
industry 2.
This model can be easily extended so that the firms live for more than one period
and have operational fixed costs. In such a case, assuming free entry, firms’ discounted
value of revenue streams net of variable costs will be equal to the sum of entry and (the
discounted value of) operational fixed costs. The decline of any of these fixed costs will
intensify competition. Therefore, as long as increasing T reduces operational fixed costs
and/or entry costs, increasing T will increase competition.
Increasing T may also increase the productivity of firms, λ. In this model, however,
this would not affect LI given that we have assumed perfectly flexible prices. Relaxing
this assumption can give another mechanism that can generate a positive relation between
LI and T .
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C Online Appendix - Further Results
Alternative Measures for Telecom Dependence
Our main measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies is the share of ex-
penditures on telecommunications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in
US industries. Our results would be wrong if this measure fails to correctly identify
the ranking of industries according to their dependence. For robustness checks we also
use expenditures on telecommunications relative to output in US industries (the so-called
"technical coefficients") and the coefficients of the inverse Leontief matrix of US industries
as measures of telecom dependence.
We obtain the data for these measures from the input-output tables of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis and average the measures over the 1997–2006 period. Table A7 offers
rank correlations for all our measures of dependence on telecommunication technologies.
Table A8 offers rank correlations for our main measures of telecom dependence and shares
of expenditures on telecommunications in the industries in European countries in our
sample.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table A11 offer the results where we use these dependence
measures, while for competition and telecom diffusion we use our main measures. The
estimated coefficients are again negative and significant which reaffirms our main result.
It can also be argued that European countries tend to be somewhat behind the United
States in terms of the use of ICT. For a robustness check, we also employ the share of
expenditures on telecommunications in 1994 in the United States.18 Column (3) in Table
A11 reports the results. The estimate of the coefficient is not different from our main
result.
For a further robustness check, we also obtain industry-level data for the United
Kingdom from the input-output tables from the OECD STAN database. Columns (4)
18We could use any date prior to 1997 and after 1993. It turns out that as we go towards 1993, our results
become more pronounced and significant. This may partly stem from the technological lag between
European countries and the United States.
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in Table A11 offers the results where we use UK data for measuring dependence on
telecommunication technologies. The estimated coefficient is smaller in absolute value
than our main result [-0.67 (0.39)]. However, it is not substantially smaller from the
result for the measure identified from the OECD STAN database for the US, which is
presented in column (3) of Table 2, [-1.65 (0.24)]. The former, in its turn, is quite close
to the main result.
A reason behind such variation can be the higher noise in the UK data. For instance,
the dependence measure identified from the data for the UK has lower rank correlations
with the share of telecommunications expenditures in industries in the remainder of sample
countries compared to the measures identified from the data for the US (see Table A8).
We have further checked that all our results are qualitatively the same for these alter-
native measures of dependence.
Alternative Measures for Competition and Industry Share
We also calculate the price cost margin from firm-level data using the Amadeus database
(PCMa) and employ it as a competition measure.
Table A9 reports correlations among all our competition measures. Table A10 reports
correlations among the remaining industry level variables.
Column (5) in Table A11 reports the results for the price cost margin, which is derived
from the Amadeus database. The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term has
the expected sign and is significant. It is considerably smaller, though, than our main
result [-0.55 (0.26)]. The predicted magnitude of the effect according to this estimate is
also smaller, -0.004. However, relative to the mean of this measure, 0.09, the predicted
magnitude is still comparably large, 5%.
Further, we have checked that our results hold when we take the number of firms from
the Amadeus database, which, in contrast to the OECD STAN database, does not have
full coverage.19
19We have also used import penetration (imports over sales) as a competition measure. The data for that
measure we have obtained from the OECD STAN database. The estimated coefficient is positive, though
not significant at the 10% level, and is not reported. The positive coefficient is consistent with the rest
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Finally, we have checked that our results are not qualitatively different if instead of
the share in sales we use the share in value-added.
Alternative Estimators and Robustness to Outliers
The competition measure PCM varies from 0 to 1. We estimate the baseline specification
(1) with Tobit and report the results in column (1) of Table A12. Further, in order to
alleviate the influence of outliers, if any, we estimate the baseline specification using a
quantile regression. We estimate it also on a sample that excludes the first and the last
percentiles of the dependent variable, PCM. The results are reported in columns (2) and
(3) of Table A12.
When appropriate, we have checked that all our results are qualitatively the same with
these alternative estimators.
Alternative Sample Restrictions: Is the UK different?
The UK might be expected to be different from the remaining countries, in terms of the
use of telecommunication technologies and its development level. Column (4) in Table
A12 excludes the UK from the sample. The result is the same as our main result.
Alternative Sample Restrictions: Are the industries, that use telecommunications the least,
different?
Our main measure for identifying the industries that use telecommunication technologies
the least is the interaction between the variables Industry Share and Telecom Dependence.
In a country, we take those industries that have a value lower than the median in the
country.
As a robustness check, we also take those industries in a country that have below the
median expenditures on telecommunications in 1995 in the country. We obtain the data
for this measure from the input-output tables from the OECD STAN database. We use
of our estimates. Meanwhile, the estimate is not significant perhaps because we have few data for that
measure.
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the dependence measure identified from that database in the estimation for this group of
industries since the OECD STAN database has a slightly different aggregation.
Column (5) of Table A12 reports the results. The estimate of the coefficient is very
close to the result which we have obtained using OECD STAN data for the dependence
measure [column (3) of Table 2].
Alternative Additional Variables/Interaction Terms
In the main text, for additional country-level variables that might proxy entry costs
we use various measures to identify the ranking of industries according to the effect
of these variables. It may also be argued that the ranking of the industries according
to their dependence on telecommunication technologies corresponds to the ranking of
industries according to the effect these additional country-level variables have on them.
In columns (1)-(6) of Table A13, we include the interactions of Telecom Dependence with
the respective variable together with our main interaction term one-by-one. Our main
result, again, stays basically unchanged.
Our measure for the diffusion of telecommunication technologies may proxy telecom-
munications industry regulation. The latter, meanwhile, may proxy for country-level
market regulation and entry costs, which matter more for industries that have a higher
dependence on telecommunication technologies. Although according to column (3) of
Table 3 and column (2) of Table A13 most likely this is not driving our results, we con-
tinue exploring such a possibility. From the OECD Stat database, we obtain a measure
of telecommunications industry regulation and include in our baseline specification its
interaction with Telecom Dependence. Column (7) of Table A13 offers the results. Our
main result is unaffected.20
It could also be that countries with bigger shadow economies have a lower reporting
of output and lower competition due to the adherence to rather informal agreements.21
20We have also checked that the changes in economy-wide product market regulation and telecommunica-
tions industry regulation (i.e., differences between 2006 and 1997 values) do not drive our results.
21For example, in our sample PCM is 6% higher in countries where the shadow economy is more than the
median compared to the remaining countries.
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Meanwhile, it could be that the industries that depend more on telecommunication tech-
nologies have a higher share in the shadow economy (e.g., services).
We take the measure of the size of the shadow economy and the data for it from
Schneider (2002). This variable is in percentage of GNP and is averaged over the period
1999–2000. Column (1) of Table A14 includes the interaction of this variable with the
measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies and reports the results. The
estimate of the coefficient on our main interaction term is virtually not affected.
In the same vein, in the baseline specification (1), we have also included the interactions
between GDP per capita and Telecom Dependence and Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) and Telecom Dependence [see columns (2) and (3) in Table A14]. The main result
is, again, virtually unaffected.
Finally, we add to our baseline specification the initial intensity of competition in an
industry-country pair. Columns (5) of Table A14 reports the results. The estimate of the
coefficient on the interaction term stays negative which reaffirms our results.22
Additional and Unreported Robustness Checks
We have performed further robustness checks. For example, we have checked that our
results stay unaffected if we:
• use the waiting list for main lines per capita as an instrumental variable (Ro¨ller and
Waverman, 2001) together with our instrumental variables and separately;
• use the number of telecommunication employees per fixed lines and mobile phone
subscribers as an additional instrumental variable;
• include in the baseline specification the principal components of the matrix of all
additional variables which explain more than 90% of the variation in the data. We
have used principal components due to the high collinearity among variables;
22In the same vein, in line with Klapper et al. (2006) we have also checked if the coefficient on the interaction
term in the baseline specification is different for countries with a higher development level and lower
corruption level. We have found no systematic and significant differences.
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• measure labor intensity with labor expenditures over output;
• add to the baseline specification the interactions of labor intensity and entry rate
variables with the overall economic freedom index (in 1997) from the Heritage Foun-
dation;
• measure financial development using private credit over GDP; and
• use other measures of human capital development from the Barro-Lee tables.
The Effect of the Quality
Recently, there have been extensive improvements in the quality of the telecommunica-
tions infrastructure. For example, the medium speed of information flow in telecommu-
nication networks has increased from several kilobits per second at the beginning of the
90s to several megabits per second nowadays. While increasing the speed of information
transmission, this progress can reduce the costs associated with information acquisition.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that in countries where the quality of the telecom-
munications infrastructure is higher, the impact of these technologies on competition is
also higher.
To test this, we use as a measure of quality the ratio of fixed broadband subscribers
to fixed-line telecommunications subscribers.23 We take the value of this ratio from 2000
since it has almost no variability before that. We also restrict sample period to 2000–2006.
In the test, we divide the countries in our sample into two groups according to the
level of the quality measure. Table A15 offers the results when we divide the countries
into high and low levels of quality according to the median and 60th, 70th, 80th, and
90th percentiles of our quality measure. These results suggest that in countries where the
quality of telecommunications infrastructure is higher, the diffusion of these technologies
has a larger positive effect on the intensity of competition in services and goods markets.
23Our results are qualitatively the same if we use the ratio of broadband subscribers to total telecommu-
nication subscribers and the ratio of broadband subscribers to internet users.
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Summary Statistics and Correlations
Table A3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Country-level
Broadband Diffusion Rate 21 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
CPI 18 7.20 1.78 5.03 9.94
GDPC 21 16140.24 8999.58 3517.05 35325.19
Shadow Economy 20 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.29
Telecom Regulation 18 3.86 1.32 1.05 5.63
Industry-level
Telecom Dependence UK 30 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.15
Telecom Dependence (1994) 47 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
Telecom Dependence (Leontief) 47 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Telecom Dependence (Output) 47 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
Industry-country-level
PCMa 928 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.52
PCM (1997) 840 0.19 0.14 0.00 0.90
Note: This table reports statistics for the variables used for further robustness checks. All variables and data sources are
defined in detail in Table A16.
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Table A5: The Country-level Values of Telecom Diffusion
Country
Telecom Telecom
Diffusion Diffusion (Revenue)
Austria 0.64 389.13
Belgium 0.56 377.41
The Czech Republic 0.37 147.74
Denmark 0.91 573.82
Estonia 0.44 116.75
Finland 0.98 512.43
France 0.68 389.85
Germany 0.65 460.63
Greece 0.59 290.06
Hungary 0.37 156.29
Ireland 0.57 562.44
Italy 0.66 380.37
The Netherlands 0.68 453.77
Norway 1.01 863.10
Poland 0.22 85.44
Portugal 0.55 351.83
Slovakia 0.30 105.28
Slovenia 0.40 135.86
Spain 0.51 316.32
Sweden 1.06 682.45
The UK 0.70 653.39
Note: This table offers the country-level values of Telecom Diffusion measures. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix for
definitions and sources of variables.
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Table A6: Telecom Dependence Measures
ISIC Industry Name Telecom Dependence [] ISIC
1994 JP UK (OECD) EU
10 Coal Mining 0.0032 0.0032 10-14 0.0146 0.0104 0.0076 0.0112
11 Oil and Gas Extraction 0.0069 0.0070
13 Mining of Metal Ores 0.0022 0.0020
14 Other Mining and Quarrying 0.0064 0.0061
15 Food Products and Beverages 0.0020 0.0021 15-16 0.0025 0.0103 0.0079 0.0060
16 Tobacco Products 0.0004 0.0006
17 Textiles 0.0035 0.0027 17-19 0.0072 0.0082 0.0066 0.0100
18 Wearing Apparel 0.0053 0.0038
19 Luggage, Handbags, Footwear 0.0028 0.0016
20 Wood, Except Furniture 0.0046 0.0039 20 0.0028 0.0076 0.0058 0.0079
21 Pulp and Paper 0.0031 0.0027 21-22 0.0104 0.0131 0.0245 0.0245
22 Publishing, Printing 0.0176 0.0146
23 Coke and Petroleum Products 0.0010 0.0010 23 0.0024 0.0037 0.0024 0.0031
24 Chemicals 0.0026 0.0023 24 0.0084 0.0142 0.0098 0.0099
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 0.0060 0.0053 25 0.0048 0.0099 0.0079 0.0102
26 Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.0062 0.0054 26 0.0047 0.0131 0.0093 0.0107
27 Basic Metals 0.0025 0.0022 27 0.0025 0.0062 0.0039 0.0055
28 Fabricated Metal Products 0.0081 0.0071 28 0.0103 0.0096 0.0102 0.0107
29 Machinery and Equipment N.E.C. 0.0058 0.0056 28 0.0063 0.0083 0.0145 0.0111
30 Office Machinery and Computers 0.0039 0.0040 30 0.0042 0.0065 0.0142 0.0137
31 Electrical Machinery 0.0040 0.0037 31 0.0052 0.0091 0.0091 0.0095
32 Communication Equipment 0.0070 0.0079 32 0.0046 0.0068 0.0160 0.0116
33 Instruments, Watches, and Clocks 0.0080 0.0081 33 0.0072 0.0106 0.0182 0.0149
34 Motor Vehicles and Trailers 0.0011 0.0010 34 0.0018 0.0051 0.0066 0.0054
35 Other Transport Equipment 0.0034 0.0029 35 0.0037 0.0057 0.0086 0.0083
36 Furniture Manufacturing N.E.C. 0.0100 0.0086 36-37 0.0061 0.0082 0.0164 0.0099
40 Electricity, Gas, Hot Water 0.0024 0.0022 40-41 0.0090 0.0055 0.0074 0.0145
41 Distribution of Water 0.0290 0.0250
45 Construction 0.0164 0.0138 45 0.0178 0.0085 0.0225 0.0083
50 Sale and Repair of Motor Vehicles 0.0281 0.0234 50-52 0.0660 0.0380 0.0480 0.0447
51 Wholesale Trade 0.0264 0.0245
52 Retail Trade 0.0216 0.0194
55 Hotels and Restaurants 0.0164 0.0149 55 0.0248 0.0338 0.0305 0.0234
60 Land Transport 0.0169 0.0149 60-63 0.0210 0.0246 0.0302 0.0238
61 Water Transport 0.0118 0.0105
62 Air Transport 0.0351 0.0321
63 Supporting Transport Activities 0.0246 0.0221
65 Financial Intermediation 0.0196 0.0205 65-67 0.0586 0.1548 0.0344 0.0803
66 Insurance and Pension Funding 0.0071 0.0074
67 Activities Auxiliary to 0.0577 0.0602
Financial Intermediation
70 Real Estate Activities 0.0206 0.0182 70 0.0088 0.0298 0.0267 0.0207
71 Renting of Machinery, Equipment 0.0228 0.0214 71 0.0115 0.0379 0.0405 0.0411
72 Computer and Related Activities 0.0634 0.0618 72 0.0421 0.0337 0.0960 0.0766
73 Research and Development 0.0185 0.0168 73 0.0654 0.0214 0.0672 0.0431
74 Other Business Activities 0.0536 0.0507 74 0.0887 0.0488 0.0878 0.0512
92 Recreational, Cultural, and 0.0179 0.0148
Sporting Activities
93 Other Service Activities 0.0384 0.0323
Note: This table offers the values of telecom dependence measures for 2-digit ISIC industries. In the first two columns
this measure is computed from US data using input-output tables obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The first column offers the values of our main dependence measure. The last four columns offer the values of telecom
dependence measures which we compute using data for Japan, the United Kingdom, the US, and European countries from
our sample. These are computed using input-output tables obtained from the OECD STAN database and are averaged
over the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. The measure computed using data from sample countries is averaged across these
countries. There are differences between BEA and OECD measures because of the differences in the aggregation levels
for the telecommunications industry. With BEA data we compute the dependence using ISIC 642 industry which is solely
for the telecommunications industry. Meanwhile, OECD data does not permit such a disaggregation and we compute
dependence measures using ISIC 64 industry which also includes post and courier activities. See Table A2 in the Data
Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for the definitions and data sources.
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Table A7: Rank Correlations - Telecom Dependence Measures
Telecom Dependence [] EU JP UK – (1994) (Leontief) (OECD)
JP 0.83
UK 0.78 0.80
– 0.87 0.87 0.75
(1994) 0.89 0.86 0.74 0.99
(Leontief) 0.65 0.56 0.52 0.78 0.79
(OECD) 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.88 0.89 0.80
(Output) 0.83 0.84 0.69 0.97 0.97 0.86 0.87
Note: This table offers the pairwise Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the measures of dependence on
telecommunication technologies. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for the
definitions and data sources. All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
Table A8: Rank Correlations - Telecom Dependence Measures and Shares of Expenditures on
Telecommunications in Sample Industry-Country Pairs
Telecom Dependence [] EU JP UK – (OECD)
JP 0.83
UK 0.78 0.80
– 0.87 0.87 0.75
(OECD) 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.88
Austria 0.83 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.78
Belgium 0.91 0.76 0.61 0.81 0.82
The Czech Republic 0.89 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.87
Denmark 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.80
Estonia 0.77 0.68 0.62 0.75 0.77
Finland 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.66
France 0.83 0.84 0.74 0.85 0.80
Germany 0.90 0.75 0.67 0.74 0.76
Greece 0.93 0.74 0.68 0.85 0.81
Hungary 0.82 0.87 0.75 0.90 0.81
Ireland 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.39
Italy 0.84 0.77 0.63 0.84 0.78
The Netherlands 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.82
Norway 0.71 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.58
Poland 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.85
Portugal 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.80
Slovakia 0.91 0.80 0.71 0.85 0.87
Slovenia 0.91 0.78 0.70 0.86 0.84
Spain 0.88 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.73
Sweden 0.87 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.80
Note: This table offers the pairwise Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the measures of dependence on
telecommunication technologies and the share of telecommunications expenditures out of total expenditures on intermediate
inputs in industries in European countries. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix -
Data for the definitions and sources of variables. All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
Table A9: Correlations - Competition Measures
1 2 3 4 5
1 HI
2 logN -0.66*
3 MS 0.88* -0.74*
4 PCM -0.00 0.16* -0.06
5 PCMa 0.16* -0.19* 0.16* 0.49*
6 PE -0.24* 0.29* -0.29* 0.27* 0.31*
Note: This table offers the pairwise correlation coefficients between competition measures. See Table A2 in the Data
Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for the definitions and sources of variables. * indicates the 5%
level of significance.
16
Table A10: Correlations - Industry-level Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Entry Rate
2 Ext. Fin. Dependence 0.05
3 Growth Potential 0.20 0.43*
4 Growth Potential EU 0.01 0.31* 0.44*
5 Labor Intensity 0.29 -0.03 0.36 -0.39
6 R&D Intensity 0.42* 0.60* 0.44* 0.22 -0.10
7 Telecom Dependence 0.35* 0.11 0.52* 0.07 0.31 0.14
Note: This table offers the pairwise correlation coefficients between industry-level variables, excluding the competition
measures. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for complete definitions and
sources of variables. * indicates the 5% level of significance.
Regression Results
Table A11: Alternative Measures of Telecom Dependence and Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Output) (Leontief) (1994) UK PCMa
Telecom Dependence [ ] -7.22*** -11.12*** -2.70*** -0.67**
× Telecom Diffusion (1.01) (1.67) (0.38) (0.30)
Telecom Dependence -0.55**
× Telecom Diffusion (0.26)
Industry Share 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.79** 0.38***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.10)
Observations 902 902 902 618 876
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.49
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specification (1) for various measures of telecom dependence and
intensity of competition. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is the competition measure PCM, which we calculate
using OECD STAN data. In these columns we vary the dependence measure. In column (1), the dependence measure is
the ratio of expenditures on telecommunications to output, Telecom Dependence (Output). In column (2), the dependence
measure is US industries’ coefficients of the inverse Leontief matrix, Telecom Dependence (Leontief). In column (3), the
dependence measure is the share of expenditures on telecommunications out of expenditures on intermediate inputs in US
industries in 1994, Telecom Dependence (1994). In column (4), the telecom dependence measure is identified from UK
industries. In column (5), the dependent variable is the competition measure PCMa, which we calculate using Amadeus
data. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for the definitions and sources
of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation method. Robust
(clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the
10% level.
17
Table A12: Alternative Estimators and Various Sample Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobit Quantile OLS w/o W/o UK
Least Telecom
1 & 100%
User
(Expenditure)
Telecom Dependence -2.66*** -2.27*** -2.56*** -2.67***
× Telecom Diffusion (0.35) (0.42) (0.36) (0.37)
Telecom Dependence (OECD) -1.16**
× Telecom Diffusion (0.50)
Chow test (p-value) 0.80 0.03
Industry Share 0.69*** 0.43* 0.46** 0.69** 0.26
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.28) (0.54)
Observations 902 902 884 861 307
R2 - 0.50 0.68 0.72 0.70
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specification for alternative estimators and various sample restrictions.
The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM. Column (1) reports the estimates from the Tobit regression with
censoring at 0 and 1, and column (2) reports the estimates from a quantile regression. Columns (3)-(5) use the least squares
estimation method. Column (3) reports the results for a sample that excludes the first and last percentiles of PCM. In
column (4), the United Kingdom is excluded from the sample. Column (5) excludes the industries in a country that have
higher-than-median expenditures on telecommunications in the country in 1995. For samples in columns (4)-(5), we perform
Chow tests for the coefficients on the interaction terms. The p-values of corresponding t-statistics are reported in the row
Chow test. See Table A2 in Data Appendix and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for the definitions and sources of
variables. Pseudo R2 is reported for the quantile regression. All regressions include industry and country dummies. Robust
(clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. ***indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the
10% level.
Table A13: Specification Check - Additional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
B.Entry Market Financial Labor Property Human Telecom
Cost Regulation Development Regulation Rights Capital Regulation
Telecom Dependence -2.49*** -3.17*** -2.55*** -2.68*** -3.50*** -2.69*** -3.34***
× Telecom Diffusion (0.40) (0.71) (0.41) (0.37) (0.47) (0.36) (0.45)
Telecom Dependence 1.07
× B.Entry Cost (1.07)
Telecom Dependence 0.11
× Market Regulation (0.47)
Telecom Dependence -0.43
× Financial Development (0.76)
Telecom Dependence -0.19
× Labor Regulation (1.34)
Telecom Dependence 4.36***
× Property Rights (1.47)
Telecom Dependence -2.01
× Human Capital (1.28)
Telecom Dependence -0.05
× Telecom Regulation (0.13)
Industry Share 0.72*** 0.80*** 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.67** 0.69*** 0.79***
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Observations 857 769 902 857 902 902 769
R2 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.70
Note: This table reports the results from specifications that augment the baseline with additional interaction terms. The
dependent variable is the competition measure PCM. See Table A2 in Data Appendix and Table A16 in Online Appendix
- Data for the definitions and sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least
squares estimation method. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table A14: Specification Check - Additional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shadow
GDPC CPI
PCM
Economy (1997)
Telecom Dependence -2.64*** -2.56*** -3.52*** -0.70***
× Telecom Diffusion (0.43) (0.77) (0.73) (0.27)
Telecom Dependence 0.86
× Shadow Economy (3.73)
Telecom Dependence -0.06
× GDPC (0.44)
Telecom Dependence 0.06
× CPI (0.17)
PCM (1997) 0.73***
(0.03)
Industry Share 0.72*** 0.69** 0.79*** 0.02
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.08)
Observations 857 902 769 840
R2 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.93
Note: This table reports the results from specifications that augment the baseline with additional variables/interaction
terms. The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix and Table A16
in the Online Appendix - Data for the definitions and sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country
dummies and use the least squares estimation method. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Table A15: High versus Low Quality - Broadband Diffusion Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
50th perc. 60th perc. 70th perc. 80th perc. 90th perc.
Telecom Dependence -2.23*** -2.22*** -2.66*** -2.99*** -2.94***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.68) (0.68) (0.63) (0.58) (0.57)
Telecom Dependence -3.75*** -3.81*** -2.77** -1.92 -3.30*
× Telecom Subscribers (1.38) (1.37) (1.31) (1.56) (1.90)
× High Broadband
Industry Share 0.71** 0.71** 0.72** 0.72** 0.72**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Observations 900 900 900 900 900
R2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Note: This table reports the results from specifications that augment the baseline with an additional interaction term. The
dependent variable is PCM and, together with the measure of telecom dependence, it is averaged over the period 2000–2006.
Industry Share and Telecom Diffusion variables are from 2000. In column (1), variable High Broadband is equal to one
for countries where Broadband Diffusion Rate is higher than the median and zero otherwise. In columns (2)-(5), High
Broadband is equal to one in countries where Broadband Diffusion Rate is greater than the 60th, 70th, 80th and 90th
percentiles of its between-countries distribution correspondingly, and zero otherwise. See Table A2 in the Data Appendix
and Table A16 in the Online Appendix - Data for complete definitions and sources of variables. All regressions include
industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation method. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in
parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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D Online Appendix - Data
Table A16: Definitions and Sources of Additional Variables
Variable Name Definition and Source
Country-level Variables
Broadband Diffusion
Rate
Fixed broadband internet subscribers per fixed-line telecommunication
subscribers. The data are for 2000. Source: Authors’ calculations using
data from ITU and GMID.
CPI Corruption perception index in 1997. Source: Transparency Interna-
tional.
GDPC GDP per capita (in 2000 US$) in 1997. Source: WDI.
Shadow Economy The size of the informal economy as the share of GNP, averaged over the
period 1999-2000. Source: Schneider (2002).
Telecom Regulation Telecommunications industry regulation indicator in 1997. It takes into
account public control, entry and market structure. Source: OECD Stat.
Industry-level Variables
Telecom Dependence UK The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of expendi-
tures on intermediate inputs in UK industries, averaged over the years
1995, 2000, and 2005. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
OECD STAN, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
(1994)
The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of expendi-
tures on intermediate inputs in US industries in 1994. Source: Authors’
calculations using data from BEA, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
(Leaontief)
The coefficients of the inverse Leontief matrix of US industries averaged
over the period 1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from
BEA, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
(Output)
The ratio of (real) expenditures on telecommunications to output in US
industries, averaged over the period 1997–2006. Source: Authors’ calcu-
lations using data from BEA, I-O tables.
Industry-country-level Variables
PCMa Price cost margin is defined as the weighted average of firm-level price
cost margins computed as operational profit over operational revenue
within an industry, averaged over the period 1997–2006. Source: Au-
thors’ calculations using data from Amadeus.
PCM (1997) PCM in 1997. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from OECD
STAN.
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Table A16 – (Continued)
Variable Name Definition and Source
Least Telecom Users (Ex-
penditure)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 for an industry-country pair if ex-
penditures on telecommunications are below the median in 1995 in the
country, and zero otherwise. Source: Authors’ calculations using data
from OECD STAN and BEA.
E Online Appendix - Data Cleaning
The Amadeus database is a product of Bureau van Dijk. It consists of full and stan-
dardized information from balance sheets and profit/loss account items, identification
information, and the industry codes of European firms.
Amadeus has a specific feature regarding the exclusion of firms from the database. If
a firm exits or stops reporting its financial data, Amadeus keeps this firm four years and
then excludes it from the database. For example, in the 2010 edition of Amadeus, the
data for 2006 do not include firms that exited in 2006 or before. For our analysis, we need
to have as full a dataset as possible in order to obtain competition measures that better
approximate the real intensity of competition. Therefore, we combine and use several
Amadeus editions: March 2011, May 2010, and June 2007 downloaded from WRDS and
August 2003 and October 2001 DVD updates from Bureau van Dijk.
From the Amadeus database, we take operational revenues (for computing the Herfind-
ahl index and the market share of the four largest firms), operational profits (for computing
the PCM), and the industry codes of the firms. We transform all industry codes into ISIC
rev. 3.1. We perform basic data cleaning in order to reduce potential selection bias and
measurement errors by:
• dropping the firms that do not report operational revenue or total assets and firms
that report their data in consolidated statements;
• imputing the missing values of key variables using linear interpolation across years.
This helps to restore possibly erroneously missing values;
• dropping the industries which have less than four firms in a given year;
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• defining severe outliers as the first and the last percentiles of relative yearly changes
in operational revenue and total assets for each country and the 2-digit industry
code. If an outlier is at the beginning or at the end of the time period for a firm,
then only the first or last observation is dropped. If an outlier is in the middle of
the time period, the whole firm is dropped; and
• excluding observations with PCM below 0 and above 1 while computing the PCM.
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